Public spending on education: Its impact on students skipping classes and completing school by Yamamura, Eiji
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Public spending on education: Its impact
on students skipping classes and
completing school
Eiji Yamamura
30. June 2010
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/23657/
MPRA Paper No. 23657, posted 7. July 2010 09:02 UTC
Public spending on education: Its impact on students 
skipping classes and completing school  
 
 
Eiji Yamamura 
 
Department of Economics, Seinan Gakuin University, 6-2-92 Sawaraku Nishijin, Fukuoka 814-8511, 
Japan 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Empirical results using cross-country data suggest that public spending on education increases the 
rate of students skipping school but does not influence the rate of students completing school. This 
infers that public spending on education leads to a deterioration in the effectiveness of education. 
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1. Introduction 
The efficacy of public spending is considered a major issue for policymakers. Related to the 
formation of human capital, it is important to examine how public spending on education influences 
educational outcomes. Although public spending would be expected to increase the supply of 
education, it is not clear if this spending really improves economic efficiency through human capital 
formation. With respect to this issue, a number of case studies have suggested that the performance 
of public school students is worse than that of private school students (e.g., Bedi and Garg, 2000; 
Lassibille and Tan, 2003). The association between public education spending and educational 
outcomes is ambiguous, possibly due to the lack of incentives for both teachers and students 
(Hanushek, 2003). Supporting empirical study results, theoretical studies suggest that public 
spending on education increases enrollment but decreases incentives for student achievement 
(Blankenau and Camera, 2009). When educational outcomes are considered, quantity as well as 
quality are considered important. 
To compare determinants of quantity and quality of education, this study used cross-country 
data to examine how public education spending affects school completion and skipping school. 
Public education spending is aimed at increasing the supply of education and enabling students in 
low-income households to attend school. This might result in a rise in school completion rates across 
populations. On the other hand, public schools are less likely than private schools to decide teacher 
salaries based on teacher performance, which is reflected in student performance. If the incentive for 
teachers to improve student attainment is smaller, performance evaluation standards become looser. 
Accordingly, students with poor performance can graduate from school, which reduces the incentive 
for students to learn and leads students to skip school. In short, if there is no incentive mechanism, 
students can complete school even if they frequently skip school. Public education spending is 
thought to reduce incentives for teachers and consequently students, leading to a rise in the rate of 
students skipping school.  
 
2. Data and Model  
This study compared the effect of public education spending on skipping class and completion 
of school. Therefore, the sample should be the same for each estimation. The Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD; 2000) provides data on how frequently 
15-year-old students skipped class in 1999. For comparison, I used completion of secondary school 
education in 2000. The sample consisted of 30 observations, corresponding to the total number of 
countries included in the OECD (2000) as well as in Barro and Lee (2001), and for which other 
relevant data are available. Table 1 includes variable definitions, sources, and a summary of 
statistics.  
Each independent variable is discussed as follows. The estimated function takes the following 
form:  
SCOMPL (or NOSKIP) i = α0 +α1 PUBEDU i  + α2 SEC70i  + α3 INCOM i  +α4 GINI i (or LOW10, 
LOW20 )+ α5 TRUST i +α6 NOCORRU i +α7 EXPEND i +α8 OECD_DMY i +εi, 
where dependent variables in nation i are rate of completed secondary school education denoted as 
SCOMPL i or rate of students who did not skip school denoted as NOSKIP i. The regression 
parameter is represented by α; εi represents the error term. If rate of public spending on education 
denoted as PUBEDU raises SCOMPL, PUBEDU will take the positive sign when SCOMP (rate of 
completed secondary school education in 2000) is the dependent variable. On the other hand, if 
PUBEDU reduces NOSKIP, PUBEDU will take the negative sign when NOSKIP is the dependent 
variable. 
As presented in Table 1, INCOM (per capita income) and SEC70 (rate of completed 
secondary school education in 1970) vary greatly among countries, reflecting the difference in 
economic development stages among them.
1
 An initial condition of educational attainment has 
commonly been incorporated as an independent variable in existing works (e.g., Bjørnskov, 2009; 
Papagapitos and Riley, 2009). In this study, SEC70 was included to control for that initial condition. 
Even if average income is sufficiently large, income distribution is thought to affect human capital 
formation. To control for income distribution, proxies such as GINI (Gini coefficients of income), 
LOW10 (Income share held by lowest 10%), and LOW20 (Income share held by lowest 20%) were 
included. As shown in Bjørnskov (2009) as well as Papagapitos and Riley (2009), social trust plays 
an important role in human capital accumulation. The measure of trust (TRUST), obtained from the 
2000 survey, was therefore anticipated to take a positive sign.
2
  
The effectiveness of public education is influenced by governance (Rajkumar and Swaroop, 
2008).
3
 Absence of corruption (NOCORRU) was included to capture the degree of governance 
corruption. The sample included developing and developed countries. Therefore, the degree of 
economic development, which cannot be fully controlled for by the variables above, was captured by 
OECD_DMY (OECD countries dummy). Actual investment in secondary education was captured by 
EXPEND (expenditure per student on secondary school).  
3. Results 
In the interest of brevity, I have concentrated my focus on results for PUBEDU and results 
where coefficients were statistically significant. Table 2 shows that PUBEDU was not statistically 
significant, although it had the expected positive signs in all estimations. This implies that PUBEDU 
does not significantly influence the completion of school. The positive effect of PUBEDU on school 
completion is thought to be neutralized by the negative effect of PUBEDU on incentives for students. 
                                                   
1 I used the robust standard error to calculate t-statistics for the purpose of controlling 
for heteroscedasticity. 
2 The measure of trust was the same as in Papagapitos and Riley (2009). 
3 The difference in wages between private and public school graduates may be 
explained by public policy and regulatory regime (Asadullah, 2009).  
In all estimations, SEC70 had a positive sign and was statistically significant, suggesting that the 
initial condition was positively associated with SCOMP. Consistent with previous works (e.g., 
Bjørnskov, 2009; Papagapitos and Riley, 2009), the coefficient sign of TRUST was positive in all 
estimations and was statistically significant in column (2), indicating that TRUST contributes to 
completion of school.  
Table 3 reveals that PUBEDU had the anticipated negative sign and was statistically 
significant at the 5% level in all estimations, congruent with the prediction. That is, PUBEDU 
reduces the incentive of students and thus leads students to skip school. Furthermore, OECD_DMY 
had a positive sign and was statistically significant at the 1% level in all estimations. As suggested in 
Table 2, OECD_DMY had no significant effect on completion of school. A joint consideration of 
OECD_DMY results in Tables 2 and 3 reveals that OECD countries do not loosen performance 
evaluation standards and provide a better incentive mechanism than other countries. Thus, it seems 
that developed countries (e.g., OECD countries) attach importance to quality of education rather than 
quantity of education.  
The PUBEDU results support the prediction that public education spending leads students to 
skip school. The quality of human capital deteriorates as a result of public education spending, while 
quantity of human capital is not affected by such spending.  
 
4. Conclusions 
This study explored how public spending influences the effectiveness of education, using 
cross-country data. Major findings indicate that a rate of public spending on education over the GDP 
decreased the rate of 15-year-olds who attended school without skipping classes but did not affect 
the rate of students completing secondary school education. This implies that public spending 
promotes deterioration in the effectiveness of education even though it seemingly does not affect 
human capital formation.  
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Table 1.  Variable definitions and basic statistics 
Variables Definition Source  Mean Standard 
deviation 
Max Min 
SCOMPL
 
Percentage of the population over the age of 25 who have completed 
secondary school education (%). 
Barro and Lee (2001) 19.3 10.0 42.9 4.1 
NOSKIP 
 
Rate of students who did not skip school within a two-week period at 
age 15 (%). 
OECD (2000) 61.4 11.3 89.7 41.5 
PUBEDU 
 
Public spending on education, total (% of GDP)   World Bank (2006) 4.9 1.3 8.3 1.2 
SEC70 
 
Percentage of the population over the age of 25 who completed 
secondary school education in 1970.(%) 
Barro and Lee (2001) 12.4 8.4 35.8 1.5 
INCOM 
 
Per capita income (thousands of US dollars). World Bank (2006) 18.8 10.1 48.2 3.7 
GINI 
 
Gini coefficient of income World Bank (2006) 35.8 8.8 57.6 24.7 
LOW10 
 
Income share held by lowest 10% World Bank (2006) 2.7 0.9 4.7 0.7 
LOW20 
    
Income share held by lowest 20% World Bank (2006) 7.0 2.0 10.5 2.6 
TRUST 
 
Rate of people who think that most people can be trusted (%) World Value Survey 
Association. (2009) 
31.9 15.7 66.5 2.8 
NOCORRU 
 
Absence of corruption measured from 0 (all-pervasive corruption) to 10 
(no corruption).  
Transparency 
International (2000) 
6.1 2.4 10 1.7 
EXPEND 
 
Expenditure per student on secondary school  (% of GDP per capita)  World Bank (2006) 20.0 6.95 38.6 7.7 
OECD_DMY  This takes 1 if observation is an OECD country, otherwise 0. (22 and 8 
observations are from OECD and other countries, respectively) 
    --- --- --- --- 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.  Dependent variable: Those who have completed secondary school education (%; OLS 
model) 
 
Variables     (1) (2) (3) 
PUBEDU 
 
0.65 
(0.42) 
0.66 
(0.43) 
0.71 
(0.45) 
SEC70 
 
0.36* 
(1.90) 
0.39* 
(2.02) 
0.37* 
(1.88) 
INCOM 
 
 -0.11 
  (-0.25) 
 -0.13 
  (-0.28) 
 -0.11 
  (-0.23) 
GINI 
 
 -0.20 
 (-1.02) 
  
 
  
 
LOW10 
 
   1.10 
 (0.52) 
 
LOW20 
    
  0.73 
 (0.73) 
TRUST 
 
24.4 
(1.66) 
28.0* 
(1.80) 
25.9 
(1.66) 
NOCORRU 
 
 0.04 
 (0.03) 
 -0.10 
 (-0.07) 
 -0.03 
 (-0.02) 
EXPEND 
 
 0.02 
 (0.08) 
 0.12 
 (0.39) 
 0.07 
 (0.21) 
OECD_DMY 
 
0.81 
 (0.19) 
1.57 
 (0.32) 
1.16 
 (0.25) 
CONSTANT 
 
  12.1 
(0.79) 
 -1.10 
(-0.16) 
 -2.12 
(-0.32) 
Adjusted R
2 
0.40 0.39 0.40 
Obs. 30 30 30 
Note. Values in parentheses are t-statistics calculated by robust standard errors. * denotes 
significance at the 10% level.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 3.  Dependent variable: Rate of 15-year-old students who did not skip school within a 
two-week period (%; OLS model) 
Variables     (1) (2) (3) 
PUBEDU 
 
  -4.43** 
(-2.64) 
  -4.26** 
(-2.72) 
  -4.29** 
(-2.67) 
SEC70 
 
0.009 
(0.03) 
0.009 
(0.03) 
0.002 
(0.01) 
INCOM 
 
  -0.23 
  (-0.53) 
  -0.22 
  (-0.53) 
  -0.23 
  (-0.52) 
GINI 
 
 -0.11 
 (-0.32) 
   
 
LOW10 
 
  1.56 
 (0.43) 
 
LOW20 
    
  0.72 
 (0.40) 
TRUST 
 
6.33 
 (0.31) 
4.27 
 (0.21) 
4.14 
 (0.20) 
NOCORRU 
 
 0.89 
 (0.42) 
 0.95 
 (0.47) 
 0.95 
 (0.46) 
EXPEND 
 
0.39 
 (0.65) 
0.40 
 (0.71) 
0.37 
 (0.63) 
OECD_DMY 
 
 11.5** 
 (2.67) 
 11.1** 
 (2.42) 
 11.1** 
 (2.47) 
CONSTANT 
 
66.1*** 
(3.00) 
57.1*** 
(7.89) 
56.9*** 
(7.42) 
Adjusted R
2 
0.15 0.16 0.16 
Obs. 30 30 30 
Note. Values in parentheses are t-statistics calculated by robust standard errors. *, ** and *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
 
 
 
